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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The purpose of this action is to determine and 
establish by decree the relative rights of the parties to 
the use of the waters of Thistle Creek from the Sanpete-
Utah County boundary line downstream to the mouth 
of Nebo Creek. 
The parties include all of the users along the stream 
between those points. 
The Lasson defendants own the ranches from the 
County line down to The Spencer Eanch; then come 
Case No. 
8448 
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Spencer, McKean, Mitchell and Siler, in the order named, 
(R. 20). Siler is a necessary par ty ; his interests lie with 
the plaintiffs, but he refused to join with us so we made 
him a defendant. He defaulted. 
Thistle Creek has its headwaters in Thistle Valley 
in Sanpete County; two creeks, namely, Clear Creek 
and Rock Creek, join Thistle Creek at the mouth of the 
canyons on the east side of the valley. Panawats Slough 
rises in some springs in the meadows in Thistle Valley 
and flows north, joining Thistle Creek a few rods north 
of the county line. This slough also picks up the runoff 
from the meadows, (R. 27). 
In the year 1894 a decree was entered in the District 
Court of Utah County, adjudicating the water rights in 
Thistle Creek as between the users in Thistle Valley on 
the one side and the users down the canyon on the other 
side. We call this the Smith Decree, (R. 14). 
In the action which resulted in the Smith Decree 
the predecessors in title to all of the parties to this action 
were the plaintiffs and the users in Thistle Valley were 
defendants. We refer to the Thistle Valley rights as the 
Indianola Rights, and the rights of the parties to this 
action as the Canyon Rights. 
The Smith Decree does not expressly allocate the 
rights of the Canyon users as among themselves; and 
there has never been an adjudication or any other pro-
ceeding until now to establish the rights of the Canyon 
users as among themselves. 
The Smith Decree, is like many of the earlier decrees, 
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somewhat incomplete. I t does not give points of diver-
sion nor fix the duty of water, irrigated acreage, etc. 
Primarily the decree divided the water for a thirty-day 
period, commencing June 15th and ending July 15th of 
each year. The parties to this action and their predeces-
sors were given two five-day turns during this period-
and the Indianola rights took two ten-day turns1. On 
July 15th, the Indianola rights were permitted by the 
Smith Decree to shut the stream off dry, and the parties 
to this action after July 15th get only the return flow 
from Thistle Valley, (R. 15). 
Historical!}^ it would appear that there generally 
has been sufficient water in Thistle Creek and its tribu-
xThe Smith Decree is set out in full at pages 14 and 15 of the Record, and it 
may be summarized as follows: 
The Indianola Rights have 
From June 15th at 6:00 a.m. to June 25th at 6:00 a.m. — All of Thistle 
Creek, Clear Creek and Rock Creek. 
From June 30th at 6:00 a.m. to July 10th at 6:00 a.m. — All of Thistle 
Creek, Clear Creek and Rock Creek. 
Also — after July 15 th down to March 1st of the next year — All of 
Thistle Creek, Clear Creek and Rock Creek, subject to the rights of the 
Canyon users. 
The Canyon Rights have 
From June 25th at 6:00 a.m. to June 30th at 6:00 a.m.; and from July 
10th at 6:00 a.m. to July 15th at 6:00 a.m. — All of Thistle Creek and 
one-fourth of Clear Creek and Rock Creek. 
Also from March 1st to June 15th — 5 acres from Hyrum Seely Ditch and 
7 acres from Panawats Ditch. 
Also — During the whole year — all of Panawats Slough and all of Gard-
ner's Dam. 
Also — Whenever the waters from Panawats Slough and Gardner's Dam 
together with 5 acres from Hyrum Seely Ditch and 7 acres from Panawats 
Ditch are less than Vz the flow of Thistle Creek and *4 the flow of Clear 
Creek and Rock Creek, then to a sufficient flow from Thistle Creek to 
make up the V2 and the XA-
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
taries to meet the needs of all of the parties at least 
until about the 15th day of May, (E. 257). I t also would 
appear that from the 15th of May until the 15th of June, 
when the Smith decree divided the water into turns as 
set forth above, there was always a substantial quantity 
of water in the source, (E. 257, 245). The Smith Decree 
of 1894 did not describe nor limit the acreage. The court 
has in this case, however, determined what the acreage 
of each of these parties is and the portion thereof which 
is cultivated ground, and the portion thereof which is 
meadow. While there was considerable time devoted to 
this acreage problem, the findings of the court in this 
regard are not questioned on this appeal. Those acreages 
are as follows, to-wit: (E. 63) 
E. L. Mitchell.... . 16.62 acres 
Frank Spencer _ 40.1 acres 
Theodarius E. McKean 76.15 acres 
George A. Siler 18.7 acres 
Sub-Total 151.49 acres 
A. Adolphus Lasson 224.95 acres 
Bernard G. Lasson 85.05 acres 
Neils Oscar Lasson 78.04 acres 
Glen D. Lasson 88.0 acres 
Sub-Total 476.04 acres 
Grand Total 627.53 acres 
During the 30 day period when the water is on turns 
with Thistle Valley, the Lassons, who are the defendants 
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and respondents here, do not irrigate their meadows 
below the Upper Wimmer Dam, and the water which 
reaches the Upper Wimmer Dam is used on the culti-
vated land, (E. 330, 236-8, 240). 
The respondents are generally upstream from the 
plaintiffs and appellants, and the velocity of water 
through their meadows is such that it would cut a deep 
channel unless check dams were maintained therein, (E. 
195). These check dams are not high enough to divert 
the water out of the channel; they are constructed of 
rock which retard the flow of the stream, holding the 
ground water table through the meadows at a reasonably 
high level and preventing heavy erosion in the channels. 
In addition, the respondents maintain diversion dams 
which take water from Thistle Creek and on to their 
meadows. The respondents contend for the right to 
maintain tight dams diverting all of the water from 
Thistle Creek on to their lands without regard to the 
quantity of water which might be available and without 
any regard for the needs of their land. They deny that 
the appellants have any right except during the 30 days 
when the water is on turns with Thistle Valley to have 
any direct flow of water remain in the channel for diver-
sion by the plaintiffs at their lands, (E. 224, 236-8). 
The trial court so found and decreed, (E. 67). The 
result of this is that the plaintiffs will be essentially 
dependent upon return flow from the lands of the 
respondents. 
Spencer had lived on his ranch for a period of 63 
years at the time of the trial, McKean on his since 1911, 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and Mitchell had owned his place since 1942, and before 
that he leased it. The Lassons are the second generation 
of that family to occupy their ranches, (R. 19, 81). 
During all the time from as far back as the memory 
of any of the witnesses extended right down to the year 
1950, there had never been any trouble among these 
people about the distribution and use of the water, (R. 
232, 290, 306). They got along fine without a water-
master, or water commissioner, or State Engineer, or 
anybody else; they distributed the water among them-
selves, (R. 232). When there was plenty they helped 
themselves to it as they felt they needed it. In times 
of shortage they shared the loss and seem to have been 
considerate of one another's needs, (R. 305-6). In years 
of normal precipitation the crops on the Lasson culti-
vated lands were usually no better or poorer than those 
on the Spencer, McKean and Mitchell places; that is 
likewise true with respect to the dry years, (R. 286, 261, 
257, 231, 88, 56). Some very dry years they all had crop 
failures, (R. 54). 
Lassons took the water whenever they needed it 
and as long as there was any water in the stream; so did 
the plaintiffs. If Spencer and McKean needed water 
when there was none coming past the Lasson diversion 
dams, they would go up the creek and open up the dams 
and let some down. At times they would see a Lasson 
on his place and mention to him their need for water 
and the matter would be amicably arranged between 
themselves, (R. 257, 232, 233, 273, 296, 305) but if a 
Lasson did not happen to be present they would take 
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what they regarded as their fair share of the stream 
and turn it down, (R. 84-87). 
In 1950, however, something transpired to change 
the happy state of affairs which had prevailed among 
these ranches on Thistle Creek. There was a case on 
trial at Manti in which Arthur R. Lasson sued Justus 
0 . Seely for damages and for an injunction for putting 
a dam in Panawats Slough. Arthur owned the southern-
most Lasson meadow at that time. In that case Arthur 
testified that he owned or claimed to own the right to 
the use of all of the waters of Panawats Slough. Frank 
M. Spencer heard that testimony. It was a surprise to 
him to hear such a claim made, for he regarded the 
Slough as tributary to Thistle Creek, and thought all 
of the Canyon users were entitled to share in the use 
of the waters of the slough and that no ranch had the 
right to all of the flow of that small stream, (R. 52). 
In the discussions which occurred among the parties 
following that disclosure of the Lasson claims to the 
Slough, appellants were apprised for the first time in 
1954 of the claims to the priority of use and exclusive 
use of the combined waters of Thistle Creek and Pana-
wats Slough, which they set up in their counterclaim, 
and which the trial court sustained by its judgment in 
this case, (R. 296-7). 
There was plenty of water for everyone in 1952, 
but in 1953 and 1954 the Lassons took all the low water; 
and the crop on the McKean Ranch, although this ranch 
had the right to the use of the Spencer water that season, 
was virtually a complete failure, (R. 54, 101, 112, 121-7). 
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When the Canyon people take their turns from 
Indianola they take the dam out to let the water down 
to the lower ranches, (E. 239, 242). The Spencers and 
McKeans have to take the dams out through the Lasson 
places during low water to let the water on downstream 
to their ranches. They have always done this, (Tr. 34). 
There is a stretch where the channel has been filled up, 
but one can see by the willows where the channel used 
to be, (Tr. 36). When the water gets down to that point 
it spreads over the meadows, (Tr. 37). On the map 
(Exhibit A) the Wimmer Dam is marked Lasson Dam.* 
Below that is the Lower Wimmer Dam, (Tr. 38). Then 
there is the White House Dam, and below that is the 
Spencer-McKean Dam, (Tr. 39). 
Since the first portion of our argument must be 
devoted to the contention that the facts do not justify 
the maintenance of tight dams on Thistle Creek, the 
diversion of all the water on the lands of the respondents 
and the depriving of the plaintiffs of direct flow, we 
forego a further discussion of the facts at this point. 
POINTS ON A P P E A L 
I. The court erred in finding and decreeing that 
the defendants hold rights to the use of the water of 
Thistle Creek and its tributaries which are prior to the 
rights of the plaintiffs. 
II . The court erred in finding and decreeing that 
the defendants should be permitted to maintain tight 
dams in Thistle Creek and to divert all of the waters 
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accumulating therein without regard to the beneficial 
needs of their land. 
I I I . The court erred in finding and decreeing that 
the defendants could maintain a tight dam at a point 
which is known as the Upper Wimmer Dam until May 
15th, diverting all waters which accumulated at that 
point. 
IV. The court erred in finding and decreeing that 
from May 15th until June 15th of each year the plain-
tiffs McKean and Spencer are only entitled to one-fifth 
of the water accumulating at their dam. 
V. The court erred in failing to determine and 
decree a duty of water for the lands of the defendants 
and in refusing to determine the other elements of an 
appropriation, including points of diversion, rates of 
flow, period of use, etc. 
VI. The court erred in failing to place all of the 
parties hereto on an equal priority, duty, period of use, 
etc., and failing to divide the waters of Thistle Creek 
and its tributaries among said parties in direct propor-
tion to the acreage owned by each. 
VII. The court erred in assessing all of the costs 
against the plaintiffs. 
AEGUMENT 
We realize that some of the statements of point 
made above overlap. Basically the two main points of 
the case involved are : (1) Should the court have given 
to the defendants a prior right senior to the rights of 
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any of the plaintiffs to the waters of Thistle Creek; 
and (2) should the court have totally disregarded all of 
the elements of the doctrine of appropriation and bene-
ficial use, and simply given to the defendants the right to 
maintain tight dams in Thistle Creek to divert and use 
all of the water, leaving to the plaintiffs only the return 
flow? I t is our basic contention that the priority of all 
of the parties should be equal, that the water should 
have been divided among all of the parties to this suit 
in direct proportion to the irrigated acreage of each, 
and that reasonable regulations should have been placed 
on the use of the water by all of the parties. We realize 
that the court has found the issues of fact against us, 
and, therefore, in the presentation of the factual argu-
ment will essentially confine ourselves to the evidence 
adduced by the defendants. We do this, although this 
is an equity case. (Leland v. Bourne, 41 Utah 125, 125 
Pac. 652). This court has on numerous occasions dis-
cussed the extent of its review in equity cases and has 
held that it can and should review both the law and the 
facts, but that it should not disturb the findings of the 
trial court, unless the Supreme Court is satisfied from 
all the evidence that the findings are contrary to the 
preponderance thereof. See Webb v. Webb, 116 Utah 
155, 209 Pac. 2d 201; and Hatch v. W. S. Hatch Compcmy, 
3 Utah 2d 295, 283 P. 2d 217. We believe that the pre-
ponderance of the evidence is clearly against the con-
clusion of the court to the effect that respondents have 
the senior right. We think that on their own testimony 
the court could not reasonably have found that they 
had rights senior and prior to those of the plaintiffs. 
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I. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DE-
C R E E I N G T H A T T H E D E F E N D A N T S HOLD 
RIGHTS TO THE USE OF THE WATERS OF 
T H I S T L E C R E E K AND I T S T R I B U T A R I E S 
WHICH ARE PRIOR TO THE RIGHTS OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS . 
All of these parties or their predecessors in interest 
were parties to a suit which was completed in 1894, and 
which resulted in the entry of the Smith Decree, (R. 21-
24). None of the parties attempted to show the origin 
of his water right prior to the Smith Decree, and there 
is no testimony to the effect that any particular indi-
vidual made an appropriation which was prior in time 
to the appropriation of any other individual. Each 
merely started with the Smith Decree. The testimony 
was, therefore, confined to the custom which has pre-
vailed since that time. Prior to 1903 no statutory filing 
was necessary2. The existence of valid appropriations 
is, therefore, not questioned. 
The Smith Decree made no effort to divide the water 
between these parties. There is simply a division of 
the waters of Thistle Creek between Thistle Valley or 
Indianola on the one hand, and these parties (the Canyon 
rights) on the other. This court has noted that when a 
court makes a joint award, the division between the 
various individuals is left open for further proceedings 
to divide the water so jointly awarded. See Gill v. Tracy, 
80 Utah 127, 13 P. 2d 329. We believe that the testimony 
of the defendants shows conclusively that the plaintiffs 
2Wellsville-East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock, 104 Utah 448, 
137 P. 2d 634; Smith v. Sanders, 112 Utah 517, 189 P. 2d 701. 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have always had their proportionate share of the water 
and that they have not been relegated to a junior 
position. 
The defendants were specifically asked whether or 
not back over the years the plaintiffs had had their 
Xjroportionate share of the water, and they answered 
that question in the affirmative, (R. 255, 231). For 
example, Glen Lasson (R. 231) testified as follows: 
" Q . Well during all those years did you ever 
know or hear when Spencer and McKean didn't 
get enough water to jjroduce a crop? A. They 
got as much water as anyone else did propor-
tionately, I think. 
" Q . That is what I mean. A. Now that is for 
the cultivated area. 
" Q . Yes, I am referring now to the cultivated 
area. A. There were some years when possibly 
the Wimmer Field would get water when there 
would be no water for Frank Spencer and Mc-
Kean, because I think it is a prior r ight. ' ' 
He goes on to state that the water was always adminis-
tered simply by the agreement of the users (R. 232), 
that McKean and Spencer would simply come up and 
say that they needed water, that he would look at it and 
let him have what he judged was about one-fourth (R. 
233), and that he would let them have about one-fourth 
of the water which accumulated at the Wimmer Dam, 
(R. 233). Bernard Lasson said the amount they got 
was one-fifth, (R. 303). 
Arthur Lasson also said plaintiffs got their propor-
tion of the water (R. 255) " the same proportion as we 
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would have I imagine after May 15 ." 
Bernard Lasson testified that when Spencer and 
McKean came upstream for water there was never a 
time when he told them they could not have water, (R. 
290); they looked at the stream and if plaintiffs did not 
have their share he would release water to them, (R. 
301, 305, 306). 
Because all of these parties or their predecessors 
were parties to the suit in 1894 which resulted in the 
Smith Decree, (R. 21-24) it was freely admitted by all 
concerned that they have been using the waters in ques-
tion since at least that date. The defendants consistently 
testified that except during extreme drouth periods the 
parties have been able to raise good crops. For example, 
Arthur Lasson testified: (R. 257) 
"Q." You know very well that they (plaintiffs) 
raised just about as good a crops as you did! 
A. Yes sir. 
" Q . And as your brothers did on their irrigated 
lands? A. That 's r ight ." 
Mr. Lasson also said that plaintiffs came up and got 
the water sometimes and sometimes Bernard Lasson 
turned it down; that he felt that plaintiffs were entitled 
to the water, and that "we don't deny they are entitled 
to the water ," (R. 257). 
Glen Lasson (R. 286) testified that the plaintiffs' 
crops generally were about as good as the Lassons, that 
their crops "were about the same." 
Of course, the plaintiffs all likewise so testified; that 
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is, that they and their predecessors had lived on the 
lands since prior to the Smith Decree; that they until 
the last three or four years when this suit arose matured 
their crops about the same as have the defendants, (R. 
54, 88, 112-114). 
The defendants admit that plaintiffs have come up-
stream for water over the years ; that they have never 
been refused water, and that defendants have never told 
the plaintiffs that defendants' rights were superior to 
plaintiffs. In this regard Glen Lasson said (R. 232) 
that the water was always handled by agreement of the 
users; that McKean and Spencer would come upstream 
for water, and that Lassons would let them have about 
one-fourth of the water accumulating at the Upper 
Wimmer Dam, (R. 233). Bernard said about one-fifth, 
(R. 303). Arthur Lasson testified that he has divided 
the water with McKean and Spencer from about May 
15th forward to June 15th, when the water goes on turn 
with the Thistle Valley users, (R. 245). He testified that 
he had maintained a tight dam up until May 15th, and 
that after May 15th Spencer and McKean had the same 
proportionate amount of water as he did, (R. 255). 
Specifically he said: 
" Q . Do you know about whether McKean gen-
erally had just about as good crops on his culti-
vated ground as your brothers and you had on 
yours up there? A. Most of the time, yes. 
" Q . Did they have sufficient water generally 
when there was water available to the rest of 
you? A. They had the same proportion as we 
would have I imagine after the 15th of May. 
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" Q . Well, when did they have to water their grain 
in the spring! A. About the same time as we 
would have on ours ." 
# # # 
" Q . Whenever they needed water on their grain 
they came up and got it? A. Came up where? 
" Q . To wherever the water was. A. Well, if 
they had water in the ditch to water with they 
wouldn't come nowheres." (R. 256) 
# * # 
" Q . You know very w e^ll that they raised just 
about as good crops as you did? A. Yes sir. 
" Q . And as your brothers did on their irrigated 
land? A. That 's right. 
" Q . Where did they get the water to do that? 
A. There was the return flow of this stream back 
into the creek until the 15th of May. Then we 
would make some division with them at the lower 
dam, the New House dam, until the 15th of June. 
" Q . Did you make that division, or did they come 
up and get it ? A. Well sometimes they came up 
and got it, but sometimes Bernard turned it down. 
" Q . Felt as if they were entitled to the water? 
A. We don't deny they are entitled to the water. ' ' 
(E. 257) 
Bernard Lasson, who apparently did much of the 
dividing, testified (E. 272) that while the Lassons kept 
tight dams in the stream until May 15th, there was 
almost always enough water in the stream until that 
time to take care of the plaintiffs. (The trial court 
found there was enough to June 25, (E. 64-5).) He was 
explaining the manner in which the water was used and 
said: 
' I would like to state that up until the 15th of " i 
15 
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May generally there was plenty of water for us 
and them too, so that it was not necessary to 
interfere with the dams and let water down to 
them. At the time of the 15th of May we let 
them have some water if the water stream was 
down, so that we didn't all have plenty or enough 
at that time we figured on about one-fifth of the 
water going dowrn to them between the 15th of 
May and the 15th of June. Of course, on the 15th 
of June, Indianola took the water and there was 
no wrater for anyone." 
Bernard Lasson went on to say at pages 294 and 
296 that while he claims the right to maintain a tight 
dam up until May 15th, that this claim was made in 
view of the fact that there is usually ample water for 
all of the parties until that date. He was asserting the 
"claim" that he could keep a tight dam even when the 
water was short. However, there is no testimony from 
him to the effect that he did so, and in explaining his 
claim he interrupted counsel twice to explain that usually 
there was no problem until the 15th of May, (E. 296), 
that there was plenty of water for everyone until then. 
Mr. Lasson admits that historically he had never 
advised the plaintiffs about this claimed May 15th date 
and that he first made this claim to take all of the water, 
if necessary, until the 15th of May during the year 1954, 
when the parties were discussing a settlement of this 
matter. He also said that plaintiffs did not agree, (B. 
297). He never in all of the time he operated his ranch 
turned Spencer or McKean down when they came up-
stream for the water (E. 301); that he gave them about 
one-fifth of the stream at the Upper Wimmer Dam, (E. 
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303). He reiterated at page 305 that he never refused 
their request for water and he again repeated that at 
Record 306 although at times when they looked at the 
stream it was concluded that they were getting their 
share. 
I t is inconceivable to us that for fifty years the 
plaintiffs could be coming upstream in the spring of the 
year when they got short of water that they would see 
the Lassons (respondents) and request that they be 
given some water; that during that fifty-year period 
they would never be refused water; that during the 
entire period the Lassons would never once assert a 
prior right or superior claim, and that the parties would 
not once mention or discuss the proposition that the 
Lassons had the right to maintain a tight dam and take 
all of the water until May 15th. The Lessons freely 
admit that when the water got short (and they say this 
would happen about May 15th) "so that there was not 
enough for all of the parties," they would share the 
water with the plaintiffs. It is inconceivable that they 
would share the water when it was short, but would not 
pro-rate during high water prior to May 15th, (R. 272). 
We submit that from the record it is conclusively 
shown that until about the 15th of May there was usually 
plenty of water for everyone. The trial court found that 
in normal years there is plenty until June 25, (Finding 
No. 9, P. 65). The parties would use the water which 
accumulated at their respective points of diversion, and 
each would generally have all he needed. This was true 
of the Indianola right also. As the stream receded and 
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there was not enough water for all to use all they needed, 
(R. 272) the plaintiffs would move upstream looking for 
water. They would meet the Lassons and request water, 
and in fifty years the Lassons did not refuse their request 
on a single occasion, (R. 305, 306). They would all look 
at the stream and release one-fourth according to Glen 
Lasson (R. 233) and one-fifth according to Bernard Las-
son, (R. 303). Thus, when the flow was high, all took 
what they needed. When water got short, the Lassons 
would share with the plaintiffs. This division of the 
waters was generally necessary after about May 15th. 
On June 15th, Indianola then took the water for ten days 
under the Smith Decree. The water was then turned 
back to all of the parties (both plaintiffs and defendants) 
for five days, (R. 236). During this five-day period the 
defendants did not contend for the right to irrigate their 
meadows, (R. 240). The dams were all taken out, (R. 
239) the waters from the main tributary known as Pana-
wats Slough were permitted to flow uninterruptedly and 
commingle with the waters of Thistle Creek, (R. 242), 
and the water during this five-day period was divided 
between the plaintiffs and the defendants for their 
cultivated grain and alfalfa lands on the basis of one-
fourth to the plaintiffs and three-fourths to the defend-
ants, (R. 239). Indianola then took the water for an 
additional ten days under the Smith Decree and then 
it again came back to all these parties (plaintiffs and 
defendants) for five more days, (R. 236-39). Again 
during these five days the water was divided one-fourth 
to the plaintiffs, and three-fourths to the defendants, 
and at that time Indianola took all the water under the 
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Smith Decree for the rest of the season and for all 
intents and purposes the irrigation season is over, (R. 
241). 
It is utterly fantastic for a court to hold that during 
extreme low water the plaintiffs were on an equal prior-
ity and pro-rated the water; but during high water the 
defendants have the superior right, and refused to pro-
rate. This is exactly opposite to the way all water rights 
in the West become vested. During high water when 
there is enough to permit it, all users take what they 
want. When the water recedes, those with senior rights 
cut off those with junior rights, and during extreme low 
w^ater only the primary users get water. If the District 
Court's judgment is permitted to stand in this case, 
plaintiffs and defendants are treated as having equal 
priority during extreme low water and during the 
period of intermittent flow, but they are placed in a 
junior position during high water prior to May 15th. 
We respectfully submit that this court should set 
aside the District Court's findings and its decree to the 
extent that the same purport to grant to the defendants 
the senior and prior right to divert the waters of Thistle 
Creek and to take all of the water away from the plain-
tiffs, except return flow, until a rigid date of May 15th. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PLACE 
REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE 
OF WATER. 
The court by its decree placed no restrictions what-
soever on the use of water by the defendants. They are 
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decreed to have the right to keep water-tight dams in 
Thistle Creek and to use all of the water diverted there-
by, (R. 72). I t is clear under the evidence that there 
are at times more than 20 c.f.s. of water in Thistle Creek3 
and the court so found in Finding No. 8, (R. 64). 
Testimony was adduced by respondents to the effect 
that the stream varies from day to day and season to 
season, and that because of this fluctuation it is imprac-
tical to take the water on turns, (R. 275). There was 
also testimony adduced by the defendants to the effect 
that this is a closed basin, and that water diverted on 
to the Lasson (Respondents) lands will yield some return 
flow to the stream. The percentage of return flow varies 
according to the quantity of water diverted to the lands. 
Engineer Jacobs, a witness of the respondents, testified 
that the percentage of water returning to the stream 
would vary with the time of year and the discharge of 
the stream. The percentage would be as high as 60 per 
cent in the early part of the season and later on the 
return flow would probably go down to 30 per cent, (R. 
362). Respondent Glen Lasson testified, (R. 330) that 
if the Lassons diverted 5 c.f.s. of water on to their 
meadows " tha t almost none of that would r e tu rn" to 
the stream. He also testified that if 20 c.f.s. were diverted 
by the Lassons, 50 per cent would return. 
Because of the fact that the lands of these users 
are in a closed basin, and surplus water diverted to the 
3Glen Lasson, an engineer, testified that five inches of water over their six foot 
weir would yield 7 c.f.s. of water, (R. 370) . Arthur R. Lasson testified that at 
times the water flows 20 inches deep over that weir, making flows as high as 
28 c.f.s., (R. 166). 
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land will return to the stream channel, and because the 
stream flow fluctuates from day to day and season to 
season, the District Court permitted the Lassons to 
maintain tight dams in the channel diverting all of the 
water on to their lands and leaving to the appellants 
only the return flow. We think that it is obvious from 
the manner in which the stream is administered when 
it is on turns with Indianola that it is not necessary to 
administer the stream in this fashion. During those 
times, the tight dams are taken out and the water is 
allowed to run directly down the channel to the appel-
lants. All of the witnesses so testified, (E. 151, 219, 239). 
See for example the testimony of Glen Lasson, (E. 330). 
Engineer Jacob also testified that it would be practical 
to turn the stream down direct, (E. 372), and that letting 
part of the stream run directly down the channel would 
be one practical system for handling the water, (E. 375). 
We readily concede that a variable stream is difficult 
to administer. However, this court has recently held 
that this fact does not justify diverting more water onto 
the land than it can beneficially use. 
The case is McNaughton v. Eaton, Case No. 8277. 
The first decision in this case is reported in 242 P . 2d 
570 (Utah), and the last decision is not yet reported. 
The case is directly in point. In the McNaughton case 
the court expressly found that the flow of water in Mc-
Naughton Gulch varied from day to day and season to 
season; that at times the flow was negligible, and that 
at other times it flowed several c.f.s. The trial court in 
this case also so found, (E. 64). 
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The court also expressly found in the McNaughton 
case that there was a drain ditch across the entire lower 
end of McNaughton's field which returned the entire 
surplus flow from McNaughton's land directly back to 
the McNaughton Gulch at a point upstream from any 
of the other points of diversion. In this case the court 
also so found, (R. 65). 
The trial court in the McNaughton case permitted 
McNaughton on the first trial to maintain tight dams in 
the McNaughton Gulch, and to divert all of the water 
accumulating therein on to his land. McNaughton argued 
on appeal that even though the quantity thus diverted 
exceeded a reasonable duty, nevertheless the drain ditch 
would return all surplus immediately back to the gulch 
so that no one was prejudiced. In the McNaughton case, 
only 66 acres were involved. The lands were situated 
on both sides of the gulch and, as here, there clearly 
was no other place for the water to go, except back to 
the gulch. The findings on a variable and fluctuating 
stream and on return flow were thus identical to the 
court 's findings here. 
On the first appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the trial court had erred in permitting McNaughton 
to take the water without reasonable limitations on his 
use. The case was remanded with instructions to the 
District Court to determine the extent of the restric-
tions. After the case was remanded the trial court placed 
restrictions on McNaughton, and McNaughton appealed. 
On the second appeal the Supreme Court held that 
because of the variable flow it was not reasonable to 
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restrict McNaughton to a maximum rate of flow of 2 
c.f.s., for at times he might have to take the entire flow 
in order to get 15 acre feet of water for each ten-day 
turn. McNaughton also urged on the second appeal that 
because of the variable stream and the fact that surplus 
would return to the channel, the most practical method 
of use was to let him divert the entire stream and let 
the downstream users who held junior rights depend on 
the return flow. The Supreme Court refused to follow 
this theory and expressly affirmed the trial court in 
establishing a duty of 3.5 acre feet of water per acre 
of land per year during the 150 day irrigation season. 
It permitted McNaughton to divert, without restriction, 
water at a sufficient rate of flow to yield a total of 
fifteen acre feet of water during each ten-day period, 
but when he had diverted that quantity, the court re-
quired him to release the balance of the water down-
stream to the junior appropriators. 
In this case w-e, of course, deny (as argued under 
Section I) that we are junior to the respondents. But 
as to this point that does not matter. Even if the 
respondents have a senior right, we think that under 
the holdings of the McNaughton case the trial court 
should have fixed the duty of water and restricted 
respondents to the quantity of water which their lands 
reasonably need. Water not needed by respondents 
should, in any event, be left in the channel to run down-
stream directly to appellants. 
There apparently is no practical difficulty in the 
establishment of diversion dams which will divert to the 
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Lassons only the water they can beneficially use. We say 
this, because during the time when the water is on turn 
with the Indianola users, the appellants are permitted 
to get their water direct, and are not restricted to the 
use only of the return flow, (E. 151, 219, 239, 330). Also, 
Engineer Jacob, called by the respondents, testified that 
it would be practical to turn the stream down directly 
to appellants, and that this would be one practical sys-
tem of irrigation, (B. 372, 375). 
We, therefore, respectfully urge that without regard 
to what this court holds, as to the matters argued under 
Section I of this brief, the trial court committed preju-
dicial error in decreeing to the respondents the right to 
maintain tight dams in Thistle Creek and to divert all 
of the water from the channel without regard to the 
duty of water, or the needs of their land. We do not 
believe that it is possible to distinguish the McNaugMon 
case from this one. The evidence in the McNaugMon 
case overwhelmingly demonstrated that since 1888 Mc-
Naughton had maintained at least two, and at times 
three, tight dams across McNaughton Gulch, and that 
for more than 60 years he had diverted all of the water 
that accumulated therein. The evidence also overwhelm-
ingly established the fact that McNaughton was the 
senior appropriator, that he had used the wTater prior 
to any use by the defendants. Yet, in the McNaugMon 
case this court squarely held that McNaughton should 
only have been permitted to divert to his land a total of 
3.5 acre feet of water per acre of land, per irrigation 
season. This was divided into 15 turns, and McNaughton 
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was restricted to fifteen acre feet of water each ten days 
for his 66 acres of land. 
We submit that the trial court has erred in granting 
to the Lassons the right to maintain numerous tight 
dams diverting to their lands the total flow of Thistle 
Creek, and leaving to appellants only the return flow, 
and this is true without regard to whether appellants 
have an equal priority with respondents, (as appellants 
urge) or whether respondents have the senior right (as 
respondents contend). 
I I I . T H E COURT ERRED IN DECREEING THAT 
THE DEFENDANTS COULD MAINTAIN A 
TIGHT DAM AT A POINT WHICH IS KNOWN 
AS THE U P P E R WIMMER DAM UNTIL MAY 
15th OF EACH YEAR. 
This Point No. I l l is partially discussed above. The 
court has expressly decreed that the Lassons need not 
share nor pro-rate the water with the plaintiffs until 
May 15th. We do not believe that the evidence will 
justify such a finding, although at one point in his testi-
mony Arthur Lasson so stated, (R. 245). We think that 
the testimony of the respondents on this point is incon-
sistent, and also contrary to experience of mankind. I t 
is also in conflict with testimony of the plaintiffs, and 
the trial court should not have adopted it. 
The trial court has found that until the 25th day of 
June of each year " there is during the normal year 
more than sufficient water to supply the needs of all the 
parties to this proceeding." (Finding No. 9, R. 65). If 
this finding is correct, then there has not been a need 
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for pro-rating the water until the water went on turns 
with Indianola during the normal water year. Never-
theless, Arthur Lasson testified that beginning the 15th 
day of May and continuing until the turn system with 
Indianola he has prorated with the plaintiffs, McKean 
and Spencer, (R, 233). Bernard Lasson also so testified, 
(R. 272). He also said (R. 273): 
" At the time of the 15th of May we let them have 
some water if the stream was down, so that we 
didn't all have plenty or enough and at that time 
we figured on about one-fifth of the water going 
down to them between the 15th of May and the 
15th of June. Of course, the 15th of June Indian-
ola took the water and there was no water for 
anyone." 
If this May 15th date were a date that had become 
fixed through usage and custom as a rigid date, it would 
have been proper to base the decree on it. But at page 
297 it was admitted by the respondents that this particu-
lar date had never even been discussed until the Fall 
of 1954. Bernard Lasson testified at page 296 of the 
Record that they claimed the right to take all of the 
water until May 15th, but he interrupted counsel to state, 
" I would like to add that there is usually ample for all 
the parties until that date." He was asked when he first 
made his claim to the water until May 15th known to 
the plaintiffs and he answered, " First time we ever dis-
cussed proportionate water rights with them" in the 
Fall of 1954. He was then specifically asked if this May 
15th date had ever been discussed before and he 
answered, "never discussed it with them before." 
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" Q . Never had any occasion to discuss it? A. 
Yes, never have. 
" Q . So that so far as you know they didn't know 
that you asserted such a claim? A. I don't know 
what they knew.' ' 
The parties were having an argument about their 
water in the Fall of 1954, (E. 296). In endeavoring to 
settle this difference, Lasson, for the first time in nearly 
60 years, asserted that plaintiffs could not pro-rate the 
water prior to May 15th. This is the first time that date 
ever came into discussion. Every party who testified 
admitted that when there was plenty of water in the 
stream during high water the plaintiffs simply diverted 
the water accumulating at their points of diversion, (E. 
233). When the water got short, so that there was not 
enough for all, plaintiffs went upstream to get their 
water, (E. 94, 233, 255, 262, 288, 305). Every witness 
who testified about this subject matter readily so ad-
mitted. 
Since all of the parties admit that the plaintiffs came 
upstream for water when there was not enough at their 
headgates, this we think must be accepted as an uncon-
tradicted fact. To this must be added the additional 
admitted fact that in the sixty years while the parties 
were following such a practice the defendants never on 
even a single occasion verbally told the plaintiffs that 
they could not have water. 
At page 290 Bernard Lasson testified that " there 
has never been a time, as I remember it, that I have 
told them they couldn't have a n y " water. He was inter-
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rupted by counsel and indicated he had not completed 
his answer, and he said: 
" A . May I explain what I did do. I didn't say 
anything only I would look at the water and see 
how it was . " 
On re-direct examination he was again asked about 
when Spencer and McKean came up and asked for addi-
tional water. He said that he never did tell Spencer and 
McKean on those occasions that they didn't have any 
right to any water and that the nature of the arrange-
ment was that he would go and look at the water "and 
see how it was . " If it was between the 15th of May and 
the 15th of June " I figured they should have 1/5 of the 
water that hit the Upper Wimmer Dam," and if they 
didn't have that such, " i n my estimation," he turned it 
down to them. He said that they left it to him to tend 
the water and that if he didn't turn enough down they 
would come up and complain, and "we would go through 
the same process again." And they never objected to 
that method of operation, (R. 302). 
He was asked again about their asking for water 
on re-cross, (E. 304). The witness said that it was not 
true, that he let Spencer and McKean "have what water 
they wanted," but (R. 305) 
" I don't know that I ever denied them any water, 
but there is lots of times that I didn't turn them 
down any. I simply said ' I will go look at the 
stream.' 
" Q . Well, did you ever say to either one of them, 
'Now you can have this much, but you can't have 
this much', and point out just how much they 
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could have? A. No I don't think I ever d id ." 
(E. 305). 
From the above testimony only one conclusion is 
possible. The parties during high water got all of the 
water they needed at their respective dams. When the 
stream receded, Spencer and McKean would go upstream 
and usually see one of the Lassons. They would tell him 
that they needed some water. The parties would go look 
at the stream and if plaintiff's share of the stream was 
going on down to Spencer and McKean they would not 
make any adjustments to the dam. If they were not 
getting their water, then the dam would be changed so 
as to pro-rate the water between them, and this method 
would continue until the water went on turns with 
Indianola. 
I t simply is contrary to the common experience of 
man that for 60 years the Lassons could have main-
tained a senior position on the stream without on a 
single occasion having asserted it. I t is from the Las-
sons' own testimony that we are told that the claiming 
of a prior right before May 15th was made for the first 
time during the trial, (E. 292). I t is also from the 
Lassons that we learn that Spencer and McKean came 
up for the water "when there was not enough for all of 
u s , " (E. 273), and that Lassons never on a single occa-
sion in sixty years told them they could not have any 
water, (E. 305); that they would go and look at the 
stream " a n d see how it was . " If plaintiffs were getting 
their share, Lasson did not turn any more down; if not 
he would release some. If he did not release enough, 
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they would again complain and "we would go through 
the process again," (R. 302). 
Again and again Lassons said that they never verb-
ally told plaintiffs they couldn't have any water, but at 
times after looking at the stream and seeing the amount 
already going down to them they made the decision not 
to turn any more down. 
If during the past sixty years Lassons had the 
prior right, certainly on at least one occasion when 
Spencer and McKean came upstream looking for water 
Lassons would have asserted that prior right. It is cer-
tain that in sixty years the season did not always break 
on exactly May 15th, and that McKean and Spencer 
would have been short of water prior to that time. Still 
the Lassons never said in effect, " I t is not May 15th 
yet, and you can't have any water." 
The court would have to find from the testimony of 
the defendants that they did pro-rate the water with the 
plaintiffs when plaintiffs requested water, and, of course, 
the plaintiffs all testified that such was the case. "When 
this is added to the fact that the defendants have said 
that the plaintiffs got proportionaely as much water as 
did the defendant (R. 231, 255); that year in and year 
out they raised crops about the same as did the defend-
ants, (R. 257, 261, 286), the decree of the court giving 
to the defendants the primary right on the stream simply 
can not stand. 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO SPENCER 
AND McKEAN ONLY ONE-FIFTH OF THE 
WATER ACCUMULATING IN THEIR DAM. 
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The Lassons do not themselves concur in their 
testimony that the plaintiffs are only entitled to 1/5 of 
the water reaching the Upper Wimmer Dam. Arthur 
Lasson testified that he did not deny that plaintiffs were 
entitled to the water, (E. 262). He also testified that 
they were entitled to about 1/4 of the water reaching 
the Upper Wimmer Dam, (R. 232-3). Bernard Lasson 
also recognized the right of the plaintiffs to receive 
water accumulating at the Upper Wimmer Dam after 
May 15th. But he said they were only entitled to 1/5 
of the water, (R. 273, 292). Since the testimony in this 
regard was coming from the defendants personally, there 
is no justification for the trial court accepting the testi-
mony of the defendants most favorable to them. One 
of the defendants said " 1 / 4 " and one said " 1 / 5 " . On 
an acreage basis the division would have been about 25 
per cent to plaintiffs and 75 per cent to Lassons. 
I t should also be noted that after the water goes on 
turns with Indianola, the division is 1/4 to the plain-
tiffs and 3/4 to the defendants, and no explanation is 
given by Bernard Lasson as to why the change. As 
noted, Arthur Lasson testified that plaintiffs were en-
titled to 1/4 of the water when about May 15th the water 
receded to a point where there was not enough for all 
the parties. In an equity case where the court can review 
the fact as well as the law, we submit that the evidence 
in this regard strongly preponderates in favor of the 
plaintiffs in the following particulars : 
(a) The defendants admit that after May 15th at 
least, the plaintiffs got their proportionate share of 
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the water, (R. 232, 255). 
(b) Defendants admit that plaintiffs' crops were 
just as good as the defendants, year in and year out, 
(R. 257, 261, 286). 
(c) One of the Lassons testified that plaintiffs got 
1/4 of the water after May 15th, (R. 232-3). 
(d) All of the defendants admit that after the 
water goes on turn with Indianola, the plaintiffs' 
share is 1/4 of all the water, (R. 51, 239). 
(e) On an acreage basis, the pro-ration between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants would give to the 
plaintiffs 1/4 of all the water. 
(f) The plaintiffs all say that they always got 
their proportionate share until the last three or four 
years. 
Against all of this we have the testimony of Bernard 
Lasson that he would estimate the stream released to 
the plaintiffs as being about 1/5 of the stream. He 
confesses that the 1/5 figure was never discussed until 
the day of the t r ia l ; that he and the plaintiffs merely 
looked at the stream and estimated whether or not they 
had their fair share of the water. If they did, the dam 
was not disturbed. If they did not he released more, 
but in determining whether or not they had their fair 
share, he confesses that this figure of 1/5 was never 
discussed. We respectfully submit that the finding of 
the court and decree in this regard is against the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 
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We also wish to expressly note that in this regard 
the Lassons are only testifying concerning the amount 
of water which comes to the Upper Wimmer Dam. We 
contend that we are entitled to approximately 25 per 
cent of all the water available to the canyon users on 
an acreage basis, and this includes Thistle Creek and 
all of its tributaries, including Panawats Slough. When 
the water goes on turn with Indianola, the dams are 
taken out of Panawats Slough and it is permitted to 
commingle with the waters of Thistle Creek, and the 
plaintiffs share in the entire combined stream on a 1/4 
basis. Unquestionably proper credit should be given to 
the defendants for such return flow as there is, but the 
court should finally decree to the plaintiffs the right to 
receive 25 per cent of all the water, and not merely the 
water which reaches the Upper Wimmer Dam. We 
reach the 25 per cent figure by looking at the acreage 
as found by the court. The Lassons have 476 acres, 
and the plaintiffs, including Mr. Siler, whose interest 
is common with the plaintiffs, have 151.57 acres, and 
this in round figures is 25 per cent of the total. 
V. THE COUET SHOULD HAVE DETERMINED 
THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE DOC-
TRINE OF APPROPRIATION. 
This point likewise has been covered in the general 
discussion above. The water is certainly governed by 
the doctrine of appropriation and the decree purporting 
to adjudicate the rights of the parties to use the public 
water should have been complete. We again cite the 
case of McNaughton v. Eaton, supra, as authority for 
the proposition that the facts here do not justify com-
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pletely ignoring all of the elements of the appropriation 
doctrine. Certainly the court should have determined 
the reasonable needs of the lands of the parties, the 
length of the irrigation season, the points of diversion, 
and other similar matters. The desirability of a decree 
being definite and certain with regard to the elements 
of appropriation can hardly be denied. See Sharp v. 
Whitmore, 51 Utah 14,, 168 Pac. 273; Francis v. Roberts, 
73 Utah 98, 272 Pac. 633; Elmer v. McCtme, 29 Utah 320, 
81 Pac. 159, and McNaughton v. Eaton, supra. 
VI. IT WAS ERRONEOUS TO AWARD T H E COSTS 
AGAINST T H E P L A I N T I F F S . 
Under the Utah rules, costs need not automatically 
be awarded against the losing party, but rather the 
court has discretion to otherwise provide. See Rule 
54(d), where in Explanatory it is stated that the rule 
leaves the matter of costs "somewhat to the discretion 
of the court, and to that extent is inconsistent with our 
present statutory provisions." Here it is obvious that 
the parties have needed a court decree to define their 
rights. They had met in the Fall of 1954 to attempt to 
resolve their differences and when they could not do 
so the decision was reached to let the court decide their 
dispute, (R. 296-7). A decree is just as necessary and 
desirable from the standpoint of the defendants as it is 
from the standpoint of the plaintiffs. Of course, if the 
judgment and decree are set aside under one of the 
points argued above, the judgment for costs should fail 
anyway, but we think where parties come into court for 
the purpose of getting a decree defining with definite-
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ness what their water rights are, the court ought in the 
exercise of its discretion to assess the costs among the 
parties on some equitable basis, such as requiring each 
party to stand his own costs and apportioning the costs 
on the basis of the quantity of water awarded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DILWORTH WOOLLEY 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
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